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We analyze two major components of electoral systems, which
can be fruitfully analyzed from an axiomatic viewpoint and are
also computational problems. We focus on the mathematical
analysis of voting rules and the districting problem.
The parts on voting and districting heavily employ the ax-
iomatic method, which allows one to endow the vast space of
conceivable rules with useful additional structure: (i) each com-
bination of desirable properties characterizes a specific class of
districting rules, and thereby helps one to assess their respective
merits; (ii) one may hope that specific combinations of axioms
single out a few, perhaps sometimes even a unique districting
rule, thus reducing the space of possibilities; and (iii) the ax-
iomatic approach may reveal incompatibility of certain axioms
by showing that no districting rule can satisfy certain com-
binations of desirable properties, thereby terminating a futile
search.
Since the axiomatic approach does not give us the ultimate
answer we also consider the derivation of rules as solutions of
optimization problems. In contrast to the known research di-
rection we propose a new way by optimizing the distance to
undesirable voting rules, namely, the dictatorial voting rules.
So far the axiomatic method could not be successfully ap-
plied to the districting problem. We present a new framework
in which we can fruitfully analyze the districting problem. In
addition, we determine the computational complexity of certain
versions of the districting problem.
2 Voting
2.1 An axiomatic approach
Let X = {1, . . . , q} be a universe of social alternatives. By
PX , we denote the set of all linear orderings (strict preference
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relations) on X, and by P ⊆ PX a generic subdomain of the
unrestricted domain PX . Moreover, denote by R the set of all
weak orderings (preference relations).
Definition 1. A mapping F :
⋃∞
n=1Pn → R that assigns a
social preference ordering F (1, ...,n) ∈ R to each n-tuple of
linear orderings and all n is called a social choice rule (SCR).
Definition 2. A SCR F satisfies the Pareto rule on P if, for
all x, y ∈ X, all i∈ P and all n,
[x i y for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒ x  y,
where  is the strict part of the social preference relation  =
F (1, ...,n).
Definition 3. A SCR F is called non-dictatorial on P if, either
#P = 1 or, for all n ≥ 2 and all i = 1, ..., n, there exist x, y ∈ X
and i∈ P such that x i y and y  x, where  = F (1, ...,n
).
Definition 4. A SCR F satisfies independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) on P if, for all x, y ∈ X, all n and all i,′i∈
P ,
[i |{x,y} =′i |{x,y} for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒|{x,y} =′ |{x,y},
where  = F (1, ...,n), ′ = F (′1, ...,′n), and  |{x,y} de-
notes the restriction of the binary relation  to the pair {x, y}.
Definition 5. We will say that P is an Arrovian domain for
the SCR F if F is non-dictatorial and satisfies the Pareto rule
as well as IIA on P .
Definition 6. Let rk[x,] denote the rank of alternative x in
the ordering . The SCR denoted by FB is called the Borda
count if for all x, y ∈ X, all n and all i, i = 1, ..., n,







where  is the social preference corresponding to (1, ...,n).
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Definition 7. A domain P satisfies the equal rank difference
(ERD) condition if, for all x, y ∈ X, either all orderings in P
agree on {x, y}, or if not, then
rk[x,]− rk[y,] = rk[x,′]− rk[y,′]
for all ,′∈ P such that |{x,y} =′ |{x,y}.
Theorem 1 (Barbie, Puppe and Tasnádi [1]). A domain is
Arrovian for the Borda count if and only if it satisfies the equal
rank difference (ERD) condition.
We are often interested in domains that are “rich” in the
sense that any alternative is on top of some preference ordering.
Definition 8. A domain P is called rich if for any x ∈ X there
exists ∈ P such that rk[x,] = 1.
The set of all cyclic permutations of a fixed ordering  is
denoted by Z().
Theorem 2 (Barbie, Puppe and Tasnádi [1]). For any linear
ordering , there is exactly one rich Arrovian domain for the
Borda count that contains , namely the cyclic permutation
domain Z().
Definition 9. A mapping f :
⋃∞
n=1Pn → X that assigns a
social alternative to each n-tuple of linear orderings and all n
is called a social choice function (SCF).
Definition 10. A SCF f is called non-manipulable, or strategy-
proof on P if for all n, all i,′i∈ P and all −i∈ Pn−1,
f(i,−i) i f(′i,−i).
Theorem 3 (Barbie, Puppe and Tasnádi [1]). On the rich do-
main P the Borda count is non-manipulable for all tie-breaking
rules τ if and only if P satisfies ERD, i.e. P is a cyclic permu-
tation domain.
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In a follow-up work (Puppe and Tasnádi [5]) we determined
the Maskin-monotonic and Nash-implementable domains for
the Borda count. In particular, the monotonic domains emerge
in a recursive way from the cyclic permutation domains. The
corresponding quite lengthy definitions and results can be found
in the thesis.
2.2 An operations research method
Voting rules can be derived as the solution of an optimization
problem on the set of social choice functions by minimizing the
distance from some plausible criterion, such as unanimity or
the Condorcet criterion. In contrast, we propose a new alterna-
tive, namely, the optimization of the distance to the undesirable
dictatorial voting rules.
Let F = XPnX be the set of SCFs. A tie-breaking rule τ :
PnX → PX maps preference profiles to linear orderings on X,
which will be only employed to resolve ties when a formula
does not determine a unique winner. The dictatorial rules will
be denoted by D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊂ F , where di is the dictatorial
rule with voter i as the dictator.
We employ in our analysis the distance function
ρ(f, g) = #{∈ PnX | f() 6= g()}, (1)
where f, g are SCFs and ρ(f, g) stands for the number of profiles
on which f and g choose different alternatives.
A possible goal could be to get as close as possible to all
dictators at the same time, which could be considered as a kind
of neutral or balanced solution with respect to all dictators and,
in this sense, as a kind of desirable solution.














The following SCF will be the balanced one.
Definition 12. The plurality rule f̃τ , where τ is an arbitrary
tie-breaking rule, is defined in the following way: If there is a
unique alternative, ranked first most often, then that alterna-
tive is the chosen one. If not, disregard those alternatives that
are not ranked first most often, and select the chosen alternative
based on the given tie-breaking rule.
Proposition 1 (Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi [2]). f̃τ ∈
Fb. Furthermore, for any anonymous f ∈ Fb there exists a
tie-breaking rule τ such that f = f̃τ .
We specify the set of least dictatorial rules by those ones
which are the furthest away from the closest dictatorial rule,
which means that we are maximizing the minimum of the dis-
tances to the dictators.
Definition 13. We define the set of least dictatorial rules by
Fld =
{
f ∈ F | ∀f ′ ∈ F : min
i∈N





The least-dictatorial rule will be the following one.
Definition 14. The reverse-plurality rule f ∗τ , where τ is an
arbitrary tie-breaking rule, is defined in the following way: If
there is a single alternative, ranked first least often, then that
alternative is the chosen one. If not, disregard those alterna-
tives that are not ranked first least often, and select the chosen
alternative based on the given tie-breaking rule.
Proposition 2 (Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi [2]). f ∗τ ∈
Fld. Furthermore, for any anonymous f ∈ Fld there exists a
tie-breaking rule τ such that f = f ∗τ .
Though f ∗τ performs well according to our specification of
a least dictatorial rule, as it can be easily verified, it can se-
lect a Pareto dominated alternative, never selects a unanimous
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winner, and violates monotonicity among many other desirable
properties. Proposition 2 can be interpreted in a way that a
reasonable rule must have a ‘dictatorial ingredient’.
It is worthwhile mentioning that based on our approach of
measuring the distance of a voting rule to the dictatorial rules
in a follow-up paper (see Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi [3])
we formulated a non-dictatorship index (NDI). By employing
computer simulations, we estimated the NDIs of some well-
known social choice functions.
3 Districting
The thesis develops an axiomatic approach to the districting
problem and investigates its computational complexity.
3.1 Axiomatic districting
We assume that parties A and B compete in an electoral system
consisting only of single member districts, where the represen-
tatives of each district are determined by plurality. The parties
as well as the independent bodies face the following districting
problem.
Definition 15 (Districting problem). A districting problem is
given by the structure Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB, t, G), where (i) the
voters are located within a subset X of the plane R2, (ii) A
is the σ-algebra on X consisting of all districts that can be
formed without geographical or any other type of constraints,
(iii) the distribution of voters is given by a measure µ on (X,A),
(iv) the distributions of party A and party B supporters are
given by measures µA and µB on (X,A) such that µ = µA +
µB, (v) t is the given number of seats in parliament, (vi) G ⊆
A, also called geography, is a collection of admissible districts
satisfying µ(g) = µ(X)/t and µA(g) 6= µB(g) for all g ∈ G, and
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admitting a partitioning of X, i.e there exist mutually disjoint
sets g′1, . . . , g′t ∈ G such that ∪ti=1g′i = X.
A districting for problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB, t, G) is a
subset D ⊆ G such that D forms a partition of X and #D = t.
We shall denote by δA(D) and δB(D) the number of districts
won by party A and party B under D, respectively. We write
DΠ for the set of all districtings of problem Π and let δA(D) =
{δA(D) : D ∈ D} and δB(D) = {δB(D) : D ∈ D} for any
D ⊆ DΠ. A solution F associates to each districting problem
Π a non-empty set of chosen districtings FΠ ⊆ DΠ.
In the summary of the thesis we restrict ourselves to the
optimal partisan solution.
Definition 16. The optimal solution OA for party A deter-
mines for districting problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB, t, G) the
set of those districtings that maximize the number of winning
districts for party A, i.e.
OAΠ = arg max
D∈DΠ
δA(D).
The optimal solution OB for party B can be defined in an anal-
ogous way.
Our first axiom requires that a solution must in fact be
“determinate” in the two-district case in the sense that it must
not leave open the issue whether there is a draw between the
two parties or a victory for one party.
Axiom 1. A solution F satisfies two-district determinacy if
for any districting problem Π with t = 2, the sets δA(FΠ) and
δB(FΠ) are singletons.
Our next axiom requires that a solution behaves “uniformly”
on the set of two-district problems in the sense that the solu-
tion must treat different two-district problems in the same way,
provided they admit the same set of possible distributions of
the number of districts won by each party.
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Axiom 2. A solution F satisfies two-district uniformity if for
any districting problems Π and Π′ with t = 2 such that δA(DΠ) =
δA(DΠ′) (and therefore also δB(DΠ) = δB(DΠ′)) we have δA(FΠ) =
δA(FΠ′) (and therefore also δB(FΠ) = δB(FΠ′)).
Our third axiom requires that if a possible districting in-
duces the same distribution of the number of winning districts
for each party than some districting chosen by a solution, it
must be chosen by this solution as well.
Axiom 3. A solution F satisfies indifference if for any district-
ing problem Π we have that D ∈ FΠ, D′ ∈ DΠ, δA(D) = δA(D′)
and δB(D) = δB(D′) implies D′ ∈ FΠ.
The following consistency axiom, requiring that a solution
to a problem should also deliver appropriate solutions to spe-
cific subproblems, plays a central role. Prior to the defini-
tion of consistency we have to introduce specific subproblems
of a districting problem. For any problem Π, any D ∈ FΠ
and any D′ ⊆ D, let Y = ∪d∈D′d and define the subproblem
Π|Y to be (Y,A|Y , µ|Y , µA|Y , µB|Y ,#D′, G|Y ), where A|Y =
{A ∩ Y : A ∈ A}, G|Y = {g ∈ G : g ⊆ Y } and µ|Y , µA|Y , µB|Y
stand for the restrictions of measures µ, µA, µB to (Y,A|Y ).
Axiom 4. A solution F satisfies consistency if for any district-
ing problem Π, any D ∈ FΠ and any D′ ⊆ D we have for
Y = ∪d∈D′d that
D′ ∈ FΠ|Y .
Our final axiom expresses the symmetric treatment of par-
ties ex ante.
Axiom 5. A solution F satisfies anonymity if exchanging the
distributions of party A and party B voters µA and µB does not
change the set of chosen districtings: for all districting problems
Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB, t, G),
D ∈ F(X,A,µ,µA,µB ,t,G) if and only if D ∈ F(X,A,µ,µB ,µA,t,G).
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We restrict the family of admissible geographies.
Definition 17. The geography G of a problem Π = (X,A, µ,
µA, µB, t, G) is linked if for any two possible districtings D,D′ ∈
DΠ there exists a sequence D1, . . . , Dk of districtings such that
D = D1, {D2, . . . , Dk−1} ⊆ DΠ, D′ = Dk, and #Di ∩ Di+1 =
t− 2 for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Now we can formulate our main results.
Theorem 4 (Puppe and Tasnádi [8]). The optimal solution
O is the only solution that satisfies two-district determinacy,
two-district uniformity, indifference and consistency on linked
geographies.
Corollary 1. There does not exist a two-district determinate,
two-district uniform, indifferent, consistent and anonymous so-
lution on linked geographies.
3.2 The computational complexity of the po-
litical districting problem
If the number of districts to be formed is large (e.g. California),
finding an optimal partisan or an unbiased districting (i.e. the
number of seats won by a party is proportional to its share of
votes in the entire population), is still infeasible. We estab-
lished that two simplified versions of the optimal gerrymander-
ing problem are NP-complete in Puppe and Tasnádi [7] and
Fleiner, Nagy and Tasnádi [4]. The NP-completeness of finding
an unbiased districting was shown in Puppe and Tasnádi [6].
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